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I. INTRODUCTION
The problems created by mass marketing, unequal bargaining power,
and hidden product hazards have necessitated major changes in products
liability law during the past thirty years.' Correspondingly, considera-
tions of cost reduction, injury avoidance, and fair risk distribution are
generally advanced as the policies behind the widespread acceptance
gained by strict liability in the 1960's.2
*The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Stephen J.
Werber, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
I B. BAUER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE LAw IN OHIO § 3-1 (1982). Justice Traynor,
foreshadowing the widespread acceptance of strict liability, recognized the impact
of these factors in his concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). Justice Traynor noted that because mass production
and mass marketing have separated the consumer from the supplier, the consumer
no longer has the opportunity or ability to obtain detailed information about
products, and must "accept them on faith." Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443. Strict
liability is appropriate in these circumstances because "[t]he manufacturer's ob-
ligation to the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between
them ... ." Id.
2 Strict liability was adopted by the California Supreme Court in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962),
and three years later was incorporated into the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 402A (1965).
The strict liability policies of reducing accident costs and allocating risks have
been described as dual goals of utility and fairness. Henderson, Coping with the
Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 931 (1981). In this
analysis, the utility goal is promoted by encouraging investment in product safety,
discouraging consumption of unsafe products, reducing transaction fees, such as
court costs, and promoting loss spreading through insurance, thus preventing an
insolvent consumer from becoming a societal burden. Id. at 931-34. The goal of
fairness is said to be promoted by strict liability because the producer is made
liable for the consumer's unfulfilled expectations of a safe product, because the
manufacturer pays for risks taken in making economically reasonable limitations
on quality control, and because the party who gains the greatest financial benefit
also bears the burden of paying for injuries. Id. at 935-39.
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A decade later, these considerations were applied to the problem of
proof of causation faced by plaintiffs who could not identify the specific
defendant who caused their injuries. 3 A limited version of this problem
had been considered earlier in the seminal case of Summers v. Tice, giving
rise to the theory of alternative liability.4 However, the large volume of
litigation surrounding the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) gave the issue
new prominence and led to a variety of theories relaxing the plaintiffs
burden of proof of causation in fact. 5 Although considerations of cost
reduction and fair distribution of risk provide a common theoretical
ground, no one rule has found consistent acceptance.
This Note will examine the causation problem raised by the plaintiff
who cannot identify one among two or more possible manufacturer-de-
fendants and will analyze the various approaches advanced to deal with
the issue. It will then focus on the treatment of these issues in the Ohio
courts. Finally, the Note will discuss the appropriateness of the Ohio
approach as it relates to the goals of fair risk distribution and cost re-
duction.
II. CAUSATION AND THE UNIDENTIFIED DEFENDANT
Causation is a critical element in products liability actions. The plain-
tiff must be able to establish a sufficient nexus between his injury and
the defendant's product. 6 When a products action is brought under either
strict liability or negligence theories, causation is broken down as in other
tort applications.7 The plaintiff traditionally bears the full burden of proof
in establishing both causation in fact and proximate cause.,
I See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924,936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Sindell,
449 U.S. 912 (1980), where the court, in developing a new theory for proof of
causation in fact, relied on the reasoning advanced by Justice Traynor in his
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 461, 150 P.2d at
440.
' 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
1 See generally Roberts & Royster, DES and the Identification Problem, 16
AKRON L. REV. 447, 455-56 (1983); Note, DES: Judicial Interest Balancing and
Innovation, 22 B.C.L. REv. 747, 749-51 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Judicial Interest
Balancing]; Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Prob-
lem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671-72 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Market Share Lia-
bility]; Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden in DES Litigation: The
Market Share Liability Theory, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 609, 611-15 (1982) [hereinafter
Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden]; Note, Proof of Causation in
Multiparty Drug Litigation, 56 TEx. L. REv. 125, 127-29 (1977) (hereinafter Note,
Proof of Causation].
6 E.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS].
See, e.g., id. §§ 41, 42.
8Id.
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Causation in fact, as used in this Note, refers to the question of whether
the defendant actually manufactured or supplied the product that injured
the plaintiff.9 Alternately, cause-in-fact answers the question: "But for
the defendant's supply or manufacture of the product, would the plaintiff
have been injured?"10 Difficulties arise when the plaintiff can satisfac-
torily establish proximate cause, including proof of injury by the product
in question, but finds it difficult to meet the burden of proof necessary to
show causation in fact.
This difficulty with defendant identification may occur when the prod-
uct in question is destroyed, or when functionally identical products are
manufactured by more than one source. 1' As mass marketing of generic
or substantially similar products continues, defendant identification is-
sues will continue to arise. The question gains unique proportions when
the plaintiff cannot offer circumstantial evidence of distinctive product
characteristics.
12
In many states other than Ohio the litigation surrounding DES and
asbestos related injuries brought this causation issue into focus. In either
the instance of the destroyed product or the multiple manufacturer sit-
uation, adherence to the traditional burden of proof of causation results
in the plaintiff being denied all compensation. 13 Judicial dissatisfaction
with this outcome has led to the development of various means of altering
the plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to the identity of the defend-
ants.
9The causation issue may be broken down into three elements, which are
grouped in varying combinations under the headings of cause-in-fact and prox-
imate cause. Although the terminology differs among courts, the three issues
involved are (1) whether the defendant's product injured the plaintiff, (2) whether
the injury was attributable to a product defect, and, in a negligence action, (3)
whether the injury was one which might have foreseeably resulted from the
defendant's distribution of the product. J. HENDERSON & A. TWERSKY, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 191-92 (1987). The terminology used in this
Note is that of the Ohio Supreme Court. See, e.g., Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co.,
15 Ohio St. 3d 396, 397, 473 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 (1984).
10 J. HENDERSON & A. TwERSKY, supra note 9, at 292.
'" P. SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, § 1209
(1981 & Supp. 1989). For examples of situations in which defendant identification
issues have occurred primarily because the product was destroyed, see Hall v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (blasting caps
exploded); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d
691 (1987) (building containing asbestos destroyed by fire). For situations in which
the defendant identification problems arose due to substantially similar products,
see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, CERT. DENIED SUB NOM. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912
(1980) (diethylstilbestrol); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 396, 473
N.E.2d 1199 (1984) (ethyl acetate).
12 DES litigation emphasized the problems caused by a lack of circumstantial
evidence to aid in product identification. Because of the considerable time span
between the use of DES and the onset of the injury involved, plaintiffs faced the
difficulties of lost medical records, memory lapse and missing witnesses. E.g.,
Note, Judicial Interest Balancing, supra note 5, at 748-49.
13 See, e.g., Note, Market Share Liability, supra note 5, at 670.
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III. APPROACHES TO ALTERING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
A. Alternative Liability and Concerted Action
Two tort theories, alternative liability and concerted action, have been
considered as a basis for recovery by the plaintiff who cannot specify
which of a number of tortious actors actually caused his injury. In many
jurisdictions, alternative liability is the accepted doctrine when this sit-
uation arises in a simple negligence action. Because elements of both
theories have been used in many later formulations of causation rules in
products liability actions, they merit a discussion here.
The theory of alternative liability was specifically developed as a so-
lution to the causation in fact problem raised by the indeterminate de-
fendant. The California Supreme Court is credited with first stating this
theory in Summers v. Tice.14 In that case, the plaintiff was injured in a
hunting accident when he was struck in the eye by birdshot.15 Both of
the plaintiff's companions had fired at the same time, using the same
size birdshot, and both had negligently fired in the plaintiff's direction. 16
Although the plaintiff could not prove which of the two had fired the shot
that hit his eye, the court held both defendants jointly and severally
liable.17 Because proximate cause was established and the conduct of both
defendants was tortious, each had the burden of absolving himself.',
The alternative liability theory was later adopted as Section 433(B)(3)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that the harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only
one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused
it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not
caused the harm.19
14 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). It has been said that the California court
first applied the reasoning of alternative liability when it extended the theory of
res ipsa loquitur to provide an inference of both causation and negligence in
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). Comment, DES and a
Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 989-90 (1978)
[hereinafter Comment, Enterprise Liability]. Other courts have shifted the burden
of proof of causation to a number of possible defendants under the name of res
ipsa loquitur, but, in effect, have applied elements of various theories, including
concerted action and alternative liability. See, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 134
N.J. Super. 1, 338 A.2d 35 (1973), affd, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 929 (1975). For a discussion of the criticisms of this application of res ipsa
loquitor see Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra, at 988-90 & nn.143-44.
1' Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 82, 199 P.2d at 2.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 88, 199 P.2d at 4.
15Id.
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965).
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The Restatement explained the rationale for shifting the burden of proof
to the defendants:
[T]he reason for the exception is the injustice of permitting
proved wrongdoers, who among them have inflicted an injury
upon the entirely innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely
because the nature of their conduct and the resulting harm has
made it difficult or impossible to prove which of them has
caused the harm.20
The fairness of this rationale, as it relates to the original facts on which
alternative liability was modeled,2 1 has been attributed to several factors.
First, all of the defendants must be shown to have acted tortiously, under
either strict liability or negligence principles. 22 This requirement removes
the possibility of a defendant whose behavior could not have proximately
caused the harm being held liable. Second, it is often stated that all
possible tortfeasors must be joined as defendants. 23 While the Restatement
does not refer to this conclusively, the purpose is to ensure that the actual
tortfeasor does not escape liability while others bear the burden of paying
damages. 24 A third factor, often cited as a requirement for the application
201d. at § 433B(3) comment f.
21 The limited nature of the situations for which alternative liability was orig-
inally intended can be seen in the examples provided in the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS. One illustration describes the facts of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.
2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) illustration
9 (1965). The other illustration also involves a simple negligence situation:
While A's automobile is stopped at an intersection, it is struck in the rear
by B's negligently driven car. Immediately afterward C's negligently driven
car strikes the rear of B's car, causing a second impact upon A's car. In one
collision or the other, A sustains an injury to his neck and shoulder. In A's
action against B and C, each defendant has the burden of proving that his
conduct did not cause the injury.
Id. at illustration 11.2 Id. at comment g.
22 The fact that all possible defendants were not before the court has been a
major factor in the rejection of alternative liability in both drug and asbestos
litigation, where hundreds of manufacturers may potentially be involved. For
discussions of this requirement, see Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33
Ohio St. 3d 40, 46, 514 N.E.2d 691, 697 (1987); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories,
102 Wash. 2d 581,591,689 P.2d 368,377 (1984). Those courts that have purported
to make alternative liability available in these situations have either maintained
the joinder requirements or modified the theory. See Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418
Mich. 311, 333, 343 N.W.2d 164, 174, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons
v. Abel, 469 U.S. 833 (1984) (plaintiff must bring all possible defendants into
court); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 568, 420 A.2d 1305, 1316
(1980) (each defendant held liable for percentage share of market). Even when
all possible defendants are before the court, alternative liability may be rejected
on broad policy grounds. E.g. Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, 305 Or. 256,
261, 751 P.2d 215, 223 (1988) (diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccination).
24 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) comment h (1965).
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of alternative liability, is that the defendants must be in a better position
than the plaintiff to identify the actual tortfeasor.25 The validity of this
requirement is questionable, and it is not entirely consistent with the
rationale advanced for shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. 26
Although the stated rationale for the imposition of alternative liability
stresses fairness to the innocent plaintiff, the factors advanced as re-
quirements for the theory emphasize that it is a causation rule. Thus,
alternative liability provides for the situation in which causation in fact
truly cannot be determined. The doctrine also has a secondary function,
facilitating the identification of the actual tortfeasor.
Alternative liability was conceived as a solution to a limited fact pat-
tern, and was put forth as a theory which might need later revision .2
When it has been considered as a theory for products liability cases in-
volving large industries, factors such as joinder of all possible tortfeasors
have proved impractical or impossible.28 Although a comment to Section
433(B)(3) of the Restatement suggests that alternative liability may be
applied to multi-defendant litigation, courts have been hesitant to use
the theory in these situations.2 9 A possible reason for this is that as the
- One court, in requiring that the defendants have greater knowledge of caus-
ation than the plaintiff, stated that the alternative liability theory is premised
on the belief that the defendants know the identity of the tortfeasor, and will
reveal it when faced with the prospect of joint and several liability. Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 505, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1074, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941,
946, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S.Ct. 350 (1989), accord
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 183, 342 N.W.2d 37, 46, cert. denied sub
nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). While alternative lia-
bility is directed, in part, to determining the identity of the actual tortfeasor, the
Hymowitz court made this the central goal by asserting that the defendants must
know the tortfeasor's identity. Under this interpretation of alternative liability,
the central purpose of compensating the innocent plaintiff is impeded whenever
causation cannot be determined by either the plaintiff or the defendants. See
supra note 20 & accompanying text.26 The proponents of this requirement apparently draw it from the language
of the seminal case, which states that "[o]rdinarily defendants are in a far better
position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury." Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). However, the California Supreme
Court later noted that, as the defendants in Summers did not have this knowledge,
it was not a requirement, but merely a condition that might accompany tortious
action by more than one person. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
600, 607 P.2d 924, 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb
& Sons v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
27See infra text accompanying note 133.
8 See supra note 23 & accompanying text.
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) comment h (1965). See also infra
note 133 & accompanying text.
[Vol. 39:207
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number of potential defendants grows, the probability that any one de-
fendant is the actual causation in fact of the plaintiff's injury tends to
decrease.30
Pure alternative liability is best applied to those situations similar to
the facts of Summers v. TiceY1 Products liability actions involving rela-
tively few tortious actors and comparatively uncommon events fit into
this category. Complications occur where the products of one industry,
with multiple participants, repeatedly cause harm. In these situations,
both the size of the potential defendant class and considerations of loss
spreading and risk apportionment warrant an adapted theory.32 As a
result, variations of alternative liability that depart from the original
joint and several damage apportionment, or which otherwise explain the
causation element, have been developed.
3 3
Concerted action, or concert-of-action, was not developed as a rule of
causation or a solution to the problem of the unidentified defendant.
3 4
The theory originated to provide a form of vicarious liability. Thus, it
imposes joint and several liability upon actors whose harmful conduct is
shown by the plaintiff to be linked by an element of agreement or con-
scious cooperation. 35 Although concerted action can be applied to extend
liability to other members of a group when the identity of the party
actually causing the harm is known, this identification is not necessary
to the final formulation of liability.36 The imposition of joint and several
- When the individual members of an entire industry are engaged in tortious
activity and any one manufacturer could have caused the plaintiff's injury, the
goals of providing safety incentives and allocating costs of injuries to those best
able to pay become more significant. At least one court has determined that these
goals outweigh the importance of relating liability to causation-in-fact, and has
opted for a form of insurer liability. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d
487, 512, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied sub nom.
Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S.Ct. 350 (1989). However, the caution of the
majority of courts is well founded, as this type of judicially imposed insurer
liability may create substantial problems. See infra text accompanying notes 103-
04.
33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
32 For a discussion of theories developed in response to these issues, see infra
pt. III.B.
The cases in which joint and several liability will be imposed have been
classified into four general groups. These are (1) situations in which the defend-
ants act in concert, (2) agency relationships that result in vicarious liability, (3)
failure of the defendants to perform a common obligation, and (4) activity resulting
in a single indivisible injury. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 6, at
§ 52. All of these traditional bases for the imposition of entire liability presuppose
that causation-in-fact has been determined. Id.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 6, at § 46.
31 While a tacit agreement may result in liability under the theory of concerted
action, knowledge of the tortious actions of another is not sufficient, unless there
is a special duty to intervene. Id. Some courts have determined that concerted
action is applicable only to instances of illegal conduct. 2 V. SCHwARTZ, P. LEE,
F. SOUK. K. KELLY & M. MULLEN, PRODUCT LIABILITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE para.
62,111 (1988).
See Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 14, at 980.
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liability has been explained on the theory that each defendant becomes
a causation in fact of the plaintiffs injury because of his contribution to
the action of the group as a whole.3 7
Because the application of concerted action obviates the requirement
of proof of causation by each individual in the group, the plaintiffs proof
of the element of agreement is especially critical. Section 876 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts sets out three situations in which joint and
several liability will be imposed on the theory of concerted action:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious
act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design
with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encourage-
ment to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial
assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.'8
Many courts have rejected the concert-of-action theory in products cases
involving unidentified defendants because proof of this agreement ele-
ment is thought to be too speculative. 39 The fact that proof of an improper
agreement can be implied through circumstantial evidence 4o has created
difficulty. The circumstantial evidence to support implied agreement is
usually found in the parallel behavior of the parties. It has been argued
that such behavior does not sufficiently establish the required element
of agreement or action in concert. 41 Imitative practices among suppliers
of a given product are a common feature of a competitive industry. Thus,
it is reasoned that a concert-of-action theory would often result in joint
and several liability among defendants who had no express or even tacit
agreement.42 Such a result would be unfair as each actor wrongfully found
to be in concert would be held to be a causation in fact of the plaintiff's
371 Id. at 973.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965).
-E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 605, 607 P.2d 924, 933,163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Sindell, 449U.S. 912 (1980); Hymowitz v. Abbott Laboratories, 73 N.Y.2d 487,508,539 N.E.2d
1069, 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue,110 S.Ct. 350 (1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 183, 342 N.W.2d
37, 46, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
40 See infra note 35.
41 E.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 604, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140. Cf.,
e.g., Cousineau v. Ford Motor Co., 140 Mich. App. 19, 34, 363 N.W.2d 721, 729,
cert. denied sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cousineau, 474 U.S. 971(1985) (manufacturers' OSHA petition campaign could support finding of con-
certed effort to relax safety standards). But see Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich.311, 339, 343 N.W.2d 164, 176, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Abel,
496 U.S. 833 (1983) (manufacturers' participation in testing and promotion of
DES could support finding of concerted action).42 E.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal Rptr. at 141.
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injury. Even a defendant who could prove that it had not supplied the
actual product that caused the plaintiffs harm could not escape liability.
3
This has led courts to fear that one supplier could be held liable for the
acts of an entire industry."
The rejection of parallel business practices as an indicator of concerted
action can be explained in terms of unfair distribution of financial bur-
den. 45 This would be evident, for example, if a small manufacturer who
had received little benefit from its supply of the product was the only
solvent defendant. The cost reduction policies prevalent in products lia-
bility law may also be relevant to the rejection of concerted action the-
ories. Inadequate evidence of an agreement or cooperation between
defendants may indicate that the parties have little control or influence
over others in the industry, and thus will not be able to effect widespread
changes.46 Also, because liability will not attach without an agreement,
manufacturers may determine that it is more advantageous to make their
own safety related errors than to join with others to address safety issues.
Furthermore, as with alternative liability, the imposition of joint and
several liability may ultimately have a detrimental effect on plaintiffs'
recoveries, because even solvent suppliers will eventually be financially
overburdened.
47
Finally, concerted action has been deemed inappropriate in defendant
identification cases due to its origin. The theory was developed to extend
liability to a group as a means of deterrence, and was not intended to be
used in proving causation.4 An application different than that originally
intended should not, in itself, be a basis for the rejection of a theory. The
goal of deterrence of hazardous activities, to a limited extent, is consistent
with many of the policies behind products liability innovations.
49 How-
43/ .
"Id. Although application of the concerted action theory could result in in-
equitable allocation of liability, one defendant would be liable for the acts of an
entire industry only if all others joined in the action were judgment proof.
For a compilation of courts declining to apply concerted action for this reason,
and for an excellent discussion of the original uses of the concerted action theory,
see Shackil v. Lederle Laboratories, 116 N.J. 155, 163, 561 A.2d 511, 515 (1989).
"The manufacturer of a useful new product, for example, would be likely to
prompt imitative practices among others in the industry, but would not neces-
sarily be able to influence the other manufacturers to produce a safer but less
profitable version of the product. See infra note 35.
47 Comment, Overcoming the Identification Burden, supra note 5, at 634. While
the defendants may be able to defray some of these costs by passing them on to
the public through product pricing or by obtaining insurance, these options may
not always produce the results desired. In some instances, insurance is available
only at great expense, and with large deductibles. As a result of these increased
costs, the safest products may become inaccessibly priced. The problem is mag-
nified when extensive injuries are caused by products such as DES. When a drug
is no longer widely marketed, the costs must be passed on through the sale of
other pharmaceutical products. The importance of avoiding price increases for
these life saving products may outweigh the short term benefits of compensating
individual plaintiffs by a method that does not apportion costs among defendants.
41 E.g. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47, cert.
denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
41 See supra notes 1-2.
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ever, when the agreement element is tenuous, the application of a con-
certed action theory will result in a fictional determination of causation
in fact. Imposition of liability without regard for causation would violate
tort principles, chill productivity among suppliers, and would permit a
direct form of virtually absolute, insurer liability upon an industry and
its individual members.
Both alternative liability and concerted action are traditional tort the-
ories which have been considered in light of the issue of causation in fact
in multi-defendant litigation. However, these theories were developed in
response to factual settings vastly different from the problem raised by
the indeterminate defendant. 5 Both theories have shortcomings when
applied to the products liability area and, perhaps for that reason, neither
theory in its pure form has had significant acceptance in the field. How-
ever, elements of both concerted action and alternative liability appear
in many of the approaches taken to the problem of the indeterminate
defendant in products liability actions.
B. Theories Developed for Products Liability Cases
Both courts and commentators have recognized that alternative lia-
bility and concert-of-action theories are inadequate when applied to
multi-party product liability actions. The inadequacies of these theories
have left the courts with two options. The first possibility is to reject both
theories, leaving many innocent consumers without compensation be-
cause they cannot prove causation. A second option is to readdress the
issue of causation in fact by limiting or eliminating the plaintiff's burden
of proof. Courts have taken various paths, and have both adapted old
theories and formulated new approaches. The courts which have opted
for recovery turned first to the concept of enterprise liability.
The general concept of "enterprise liability" is the idea that an enter-
prise should bear the cost of the losses it causes. In other words, the
parties who market a defective product can best control the associated
risks, and should be held liable.5' In Hall v. E.L DuPont De Nemours &
Co.,52 the applicability of this concept to a products liability action in-
volving indeterminate defendants was considered. In one of the cases
consolidated in Hall, the plaintiffs were injured in twelve unrelated ac-
cidents involving dynamite blasting caps.5 3 Because all identifying fea-
60 Alternative liability was developed to aid the plaintiff in proof of causationin simple negligence situations. See supra notes 15-21 & accompanying text.Concerted action evolved as a means of controlling group activity, and has only
a coincidental relationship to the causation issue. See supra notes 34-38 & ac-
companying text.
1,1 Bauer, supra note 1, at § 1-10; Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d588, 598, 607 P.2d 924, 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136, cert. denied sub nom. E.R.Squibb & Sons v. Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
52 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
-Id. at 359.
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tures on the caps had been destroyed, the plaintiffs sued six
manufacturers and their trade association. These manufacturers repre-
sented most of the United States explosives industry.
54 The gravamen of
the complaint was a theory of concerted action, and the court utilized
concerted action terminology. Nevertheless, the actual basis for the im-
position of liability was distinct from its purported source. As courts often
do, old language was used to create new law.
As one theory available to the plaintiffs, the court stated that if the
manufacturers had worked through the trade association to determine
precautionary measures, such as warnings on the blasting caps, then the
enterprise as a whole could be said to control the risk, and the explosives
industry could be held jointly liable.55 The court reasoned that
"[p]recautions should be taken and liability imposed... "at an industry-
wide level. 56 The court went on to explain the necessity for joint liability:
The point is not only that the damage is caused by multiple
actors, but that the sole feasible way of anticipating costs or
damages and devising practical remedies is to consider the
activities of a group. We do not... suggest that private actions
are the best way to meet these problems but only that in the
absence of preemptive legislation, tort principals will support
a remedy.57
Although Hall made reference to both concerted action and enterprise
liability, the court went on to set out a modified version of alternative
liability which would operate as a corollary theory of causation.
58 Thus,
although alternative liability had previously been applied where all pos-
sible tortfeasors had been joined as defendants, here the plaintiffs needed
only to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the products had
not come from a different source.59 After this, each defendant could escape
liability by proving that it had not manufactured the blasting caps in-
volved in the accidents. 60 This possibility of exculpation is contrary to the
theory of concerted action, where the defendants' participation in group
activity, rather than the supply of a specific product, is treated as the
causation in fact of the plaintiffs injury.
While Hall has been the subject of a variety of interpretations, and has
been the basis for other proposed theories, two aspects of the case are
particularly notable. 61 First, although a showing of concerted group ac-
Id.
55 Id. at 378.
'4Hall v. E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
57 Id.
51 Id. at 379.
59 Id.
roId.
61 Because the Hall court dealt with two consolidated cases, and set out a
number of theories of recovery, the opinion has been the basis of much commen-
tary. For a detailed analysis of Hall as it applies to DES litigation, see Comment,
Enterprise Liability, supra note 14, at 981-85.
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tivity by an industry does not provide a basis for unconditional liability
under Hall, it does allow for the preliminary identification of an entire
industry as a suitable defendant group. Because it need only be "[m]ore
probable than not" that the actual tortfeasor is before the court, the focus
is shifted away from determining causation in fact, and toward the goals
of risk allocation and cost reduction.62
A second notable aspect of Hall is the unexplained combination of
theories. This points up a fundamental conflict created by the indeter-
minate defendant in a products liability case. While the Hall court cites
strict liability commentary in its argument for risk allocation, it also
indicates that a legislative solution is more appropriate.6 3 The addition
of an alternative liability qualifier may indicate the court's uneasiness
with its role. While strict liability removed the requirements of intent or
negligence to meet society's needs, deemphasizing causation may leave
the courts little on which to efficiently and consistently base decisions.
A related issue concerns the extent to which courts can ignore the
conduct of a party when imposing liability. At a certain point the actual,
rather than theoretical, status of insurer becomes operative. If fault plays
no role in imposing strict liability and conduct plays no role in estab-
lishing causation in fact, there is little protection for an innocent man-
ufacturer whose product happens to fall within a generic class. The Hall
court appears to have recognized at least some of this danger. The same
may not be true of courts taking even greater steps to protect injured
consumers.
Many of the more recent approaches to altering the burden of proof for
the plaintiff who cannot identify one defendant have been developed in
cases involving the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES).6 DES, a drug which
had been commonly prescribed to pregnant women, was subsequently
shown to have a significant correlation to the development of cancer in
the adult female offspring of those women.6 5 Because of the time lapse
62Hall v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 379 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
13Id. at 378.
- These approaches include market share liability, risk share liability and
national market share liability. See infra notes 69-99 & accompanying text. Other
variations of alternative liability have also been developed in the course of DESlitigation. See, e.g., Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d
1305 (1980) (percentage share liability); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash.
2d 581, 687 P.2d 368 (1984) (market share alternative liability).
DES, a synthetic estrogen, was prescribed to millions of pregnant women
for the prevention of miscarriage between 1947 and 1971. Because DES was never
patented, the drug was marketed in a generic form by as many as 300 companiesduring those years. By 1971, medical researchers had recognized a significantincrease in previously rare genital tract cancers and abnormalities among young
women who had been exposed to DES in utero. The actions against the DES
manufacturers are typically instituted two decades after the mothers' ingestion
of the drug. In these suits, the plaintiffs allege that the manufacturers marketed
the drug without adequate testing, and that they knew or should have known
that DES was both dangerous and ineffective for use during pregnancy. Comment,
Enterprise Liability, supra note 14, at 96-67.
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between the mothers' ingestion of the drug and the onset of the plaintiffs'
injuries, and because a functionally identical product was sold by
hundreds of manufacturers, plaintiffs have had difficulty identifying one
defendant.
6 6
Although DES litigation is characterized by many unique factors, the
large number of manufacturers and the generic nature of the drug have
had the greatest effect on the methods used to prove causation in fact.
For example, several courts, faced with litigation related to DES, have
considered and rejected the application of enterprise liability.6 7 Because
DES was manufactured by hundreds of companies, rather than the six
involved in Hall, the presumption of joint control of risk is considered to
be weak.
66
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories the California Supreme Court declined
to apply enterprise liability, and instead outlined a new theory of market
share liability.69 First, it was presumed that the DES manufacturers had
acted tortiously toward the plaintiff, and that DES was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury.70 Next, the DES plaintiff was required to
DES, which is still prescribed for conditions unrelated to pregnancy, continues
to be an area of concern. The mothers who took DES during pregnancy may have
an increased risk of breast cancer, and further research has been recommended
to determine the effects of DES on infertility and other reproductive difficulties.
U. S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICE, DIETHYLSTILBESTROL TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS (1985). The re-
search on men who were exposed in utero to DES currently is inconclusive on
the issue of infertility. However, it is agreed that these men have a higher in-
cidence of genital tract abnormalities. E.g. Hembree, Nagler, Fang, Myles &
Jagiello, Infertility in a Patient with Abnormal Spermatogenesis and In Utero
DES Exposure, 33 INT'L J. FERTILITY 173, 176 (1988); Shy, Stenchever, Karp,
Berger, Williamson & Leonard, Genital Tract Examinations and Zona-free Ham-
ster Egg Penetration Tests from Men Exposed In Utero to Diethylstilbestrol, 42
FERTILITY & STERILITY 772, 777 (1984).
- See supra note 12.
61 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 608, 607 P.2d 924, 934, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, 142, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Sindell, 449 U.S.
912 (1980); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 186, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47, cert.
denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
6 The role of FDA regulations followed by the drug industry has also been
considered in relation to the imposition of enterprise liability. Adherence to these
regulations alone will not absolve a manufacturer when culpability is known.
However, when causation is uncertain, the FDA's imposition of industry standards
indicates that enterprise liability could be inappropriate, because the control
element would be weakened. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 143; Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 186, 342 N.W.2d at 47. In situations involving
patented drugs, separate licensing by the FDA has also been used to demonstrate
a lack of joint control of risk among manufacturers. Shackil v. Lederle Labora-
tories, 116 N.J.155, 561 A.2d 511, 516 (1989).
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The court
actually did adopt many elements of the modified enterprise theory set out by
one commentator. Compare id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145 with
Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 14, at 995.
"I Because the defendants demurred to the complaint, the allegations of neg-
ligence were presumed to be true. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 134.
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join as defendants an undefined "substantial share" of the manufacturers
of the particular pills her mother may have taken. 71 Then, unless a de-fendant could prove that it did not produce the pills actually taken by
the plaintiffs mother, it would be liable for a percentage of the totaldamages proportional to its share of the market, with the market defined
as that relevant to the plaintiff's mother.72
In explaining its reasons for applying market share liability, the Sindell
court adopted the rationale of fairness to the innocent plaintiff set out inSummers v. Tice.7
- However, the Sindell court went further, and cited
rationale borrowed from arguments for the imposition of strict liability.74
Here, as in Hall, the manufacturers were said not only to be better able
to bear the loss, but to be in the best position to take preventative meas-
ures, and were therefore the best target for incentives to increase product
safety. The market share apportionment among defendants was thought
to be fair because it would approximate each defendant's share of re-
sponsibility for the injuries of the relevant group of plaintiffs.76
The market share approach is generally thought to be an improvement
over the pure forms of either alternative liability or concerted action inDES cases. 77 Under market share, the plaintiff need not prove concerted
activity or an industry-wide standard allowing unsafe products, and does
not have to join all possible tortfeasors, as often required in alternative
liability.78 Also, it has been argued that liability will closely approximate
actual causation if each defendant is held liable for its market share ofdamages in all cases. With no complications, the burden on each defendant
would be the same as if it could always be identified and had to pay the
entire amount in a number of cases proportional to its market share.7 9
7, Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The Sindell court specifically
stated that "only a substantial percentage is required.,. ." rather than adoptingthe 75-80% suggested in Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 14, at 996.Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. However, thedefendants named in that action allegedly produced 90% of the DES marketed.
Id.
73 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163Cal. Rptr. 132, 144, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Sindell, 449 U.S.912 (1980).74 
/d.
7 5 Id.76 Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. This apportionment ofliability could also be said to correspond to the benefit that each defendant had
received from the product.
77 See e.g., Note, Judicial Interest Balancing, supra note 5, at 776; Note, MarketShare Liability, supra note 5, at 675.78 It has been noted that this may actually favor the plaintiff who cannotidentify one defendant, because she will have a greater chance of recovering atleast partial damages from a solvent party. Comment, Overcoming the Identifi-
cation Burden, supra note 5, at 632.79 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 612, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163Cal. Rptr. 132, 145, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Sindell, 449 U.S.912 (1980). Cf. Comment, Enterprise Liability, supra note 14, at 994 (discussing
the fairness of joint liability under the alternative theory).
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Like enterprise liability, market share recognizes the applicability of
the strict liability goals of fair risk allocation and safety incentives, which
would lead to an overall reduction in the costs of injuries. However, mar-
ket share liability is also similar to the theory suggested in Hall in that
it is directed toward a goal of determining or approximating actual caus-
ation. 0
The Sindell court's approach to balancing broad policy goals with the
need to link liability to causation might not promote both objectives to
the extent intended. First, allowing a reduction in necessary parties by
permitting joinder of less than all of the possible tortfeasors obviously
reduces the possibility of the actual actor being found. This is, however,
a necessary compromise when complicating factors preclude joinder of all
manufacturers."' The apportionment by market share seeks to temper
this by allocating damages to each defendant in a proportion which
"[w]ould approximate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own
products . . ." over time.8 2 Allowing each defendant to escape liability by
proving that it had not manufactured the pills in question could negate
this effect. It is possible, for example, that the manufacturer of a pill with
an unusual appearance could escape liability in many of the cases in
which it was not the actual tortfeasor, while similarly innocent manu-
facturers of plain pills could not.8 3 This would occur if plaintiffs were able
to exclude the unusual pill from the field of similar products more often
than they were able to identify it specifically as the medication taken.
Thus, some manufacturers could be liable for substantially less than the
injuries caused by their own products.
Second, the market share theory may also fail to fully promote the
goals of risk allocation and cost reduction. The determination of market
share in Sindell proved to be very difficult and time consuming." The
transaction costs involved in this procedure could easily outweigh any
benefit that would result. Third, if the necessary percentage of manufac-
turers to be joined is inconsistent, or if the market share could not be
determined accurately, the theory would impose liability in a manner
that could not be anticipated and insured against by manufacturers.
Finally, Sindell did not address the question of whether joint and sev-
eral liability would be applicable. This determination is significant in
evaluating whether the theory is effective in promoting the policies of
strict liability. Those suppliers held jointly liable could be exposed to costs
disproportionate to their market share, and thus disproportionate to their
- Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 509, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1076,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 948, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S.Ct.
350 (1989).
' See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
82 Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
California eventually determined that using a national market share was
more feasible than working with smaller geographical units. Id. at 509, 539
N.E.2d at 1076, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 948 (citing In re Complex DES Litigation, No.
830-109 (Cal. Super. Ct.)).
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fair allocation of risk. However, the application of several liability would
prevent many plaintiffs, who are the least able to bear the costs of their
injuries, from obtaining full recovery. The California Supreme Court re-
solved the issue in Brown v. Superior Court,8 5 holding that the liability
of DES manufacturers under the market share theory was several only.
By choosing this approach, the California court implicitly attacked the
policies of fairness to the innocent plaintiff and shifting loss to the party
best able to pay. As these were key policies underlying Sindell, Brown
has also drawn the acceptance of market share liability in its progenitor
court into question.
Several courts, also in the context of DES litigation, have formulated
liability theories that are designed to avoid some of the weaker elements
of market share liability. In Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,8 the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin recognized the difficulty of determining the appropriate mar-
ket share and declined to apply the theory on that ground. Instead of
basing liability on the proportion of harm caused by a manufacturer's
product, the Collins court considered the contribution that each manu-
facturer had made to the plaintiff's risk of injury by marketing its
product.8 7
The theory of "risk share liability" defined in Collins was not conceived
as a variant of alternative liability, and thus involves a different proce-
dure. To avoid the difficulty of determining a suitable group of defendants,
the court required the plaintiff to bring an action in negligence or strict
liability against only one defendant.8 8 Equitable distribution of liability
was said to be attained by allowing the defendant to implead other man-
ufacturers as third party defendants.8 9 The plaintiff then had the burden
of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant had sup-
plied a product with the same physical characteristics as that responsible
for her injury.90 As in alternative liability, the burden then shifted to the
defendants to prove, by time or geographical location, that they could not
have supplied the specific product in question.8 1
Under the risk share theory, if more than one defendant is found to be
liable, the damages are apportioned by a jury under the state's compar-
44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1075, 751 P.2d 470, 487, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 428 (1988).
"1 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons
v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
11 Id. at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
The plaintiff was not limited to suing only one manufacturer. The court
noted that the plaintiff would be encouraged to join as many defendants as rea-
sonably possible to prevent future actions from being barred by the statute of
limitations. Id. at 194, 342 N.W.2d at 51.
Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 194, 342 N.W.2d 37, 51, cert. denied
sub nom., E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
go Id.
11 Id. at 198, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
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ative fault statute . 2 Percentages of liability are assigned according to
the risk imposed on the plaintiff by each manufacturer. This risk is de-
termined by considering a number of factors, including the general size
of each defendant's relevant market share.93
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co. 94 New York also adopted a theory which
apportions liability among defendants according to the risk imposed.
Here, the court was concerned not with the individual plaintiffs risk of
injury, but with the risk imposed on the public in general. The difficulty
encountered by the Sindell court in determining market shares at an
individualized level was noted.9 5 Allowing a jury to determine liabilities
according to personal risk was also rejected as time consuming and in-
consistent.96 Conceding that it could make no connection between liability
and causation in fact in an individual case, the Hymowitz court chose to
apportion liability according to national market share.9 7 Under the "na-
tional market share" theory, a defendant cannot escape liability by show-
ing that it did not manufacture the product which caused the plaintiff's
injury. The theory simply abolishes all need for causation in fact. 98 How-
ever, liability is several only, resulting in a less than 100% recovery for
the plaintiff if the manufacturers joined as defendants represent less than
100% of the market.9 9 The Hymowitz approach is easily applied and highly
supportive of consumer protection. Under this theory, any manufacturer
who contributed to any individual's risk of harm becomes severally liable
for all resultant injuries. The limitation on liability is provided by the
portion of the market controlled by each individual defendant. Although
the wisdom of the Hymowitz approach may be questioned, its simplicity
of application and direct approach to the policy promoted have merit.
92 The Wisconsin statute is written in terms of negligence, but it has also been
applied to strict liability actions. Id. at 199, 342 N.W.2d at 53. Although the
statute refers only to proportionate fault between the plaintiff and the defendant,
it is used to apportion liability among defendants. Id. The statute provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
... to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering.
Wis. Stat. § 895.045 (1987). The statute does not specify whether this liability is
joint and several, but this is apparently intended by the Wisconsin court. Collins,
116 Wis. 2d at 194, 342 N.W.2d at 50. See infra note 102 & accompanying text.
91 Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 200, 342 N.W.2d 37, 53, cert. denied
sub nor., E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
- 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941, cert. denied sub nom.
Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S.Ct. 350 (1989).
95 Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
-97 California has also chosen to compile statistics on national market share for
DES, rather than considering local markets. See supra note 84 & accompanying
text.
91 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 483, 512, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078,
541 N.Y.S.2d 941, 950, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S. Ct.
350 (1989).
Id. at 513, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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Both Hymowitz and Collins, in making a conceptual shift from actual
injury to creation of a risk, explicitly recognize the goals of effective
spreading of losses and cost reduction through safety incentives. 00 How-
ever, in application and effect the two theories differ. The risk share theory
espoused in Collins maintains a substantial connection with causation-
in-fact through a focus on individual risk. Although this causal link
provides a sense of fairness under traditional tort principles, the jury
apportionment process may actually be time consuming, expensive and
unpredictable.' In addition, the liability of a defendant under the risk
share theory is apparently joint and several. 10 Joint and several liability
allows the plaintiff to obtain full recovery when some defendants are
judgment proof, beyond the court's jurisdiction, or no longer subject to
process for any reason. This furthers the policy of allocating costs to the
manufacturers, who may be better able to pay. However, this theory also
removes the focus from an imposition of liability that is proportional to
individual risk. In addition to weakening the link between the risk share
theory and causation in fact, this undermines the policy of fair risk al-
location, and may have a negative impact on safety incentives.
In contrast to the risk share theory, the national market share theory
utilized in Hymowitz makes a complete departure from traditional caus-
ation principals in favor of optimizing risk allocation and cost reduction.
National market share liability operates as a judicially administered
insurance system. A manufacturer who creates greater risks makes larger
payments on a regular basis. Whether a particular injury is attributable
to that manufacturer's products is rendered academic.
Difficulties in the application of national market share liability may
arise for at least three reasons. The first problem arises because the
plaintiff may recover less than 100% of her damages if less than the
entire national market is joined. 10 3 When a consumer, for reasons of time
and expense, can join only a limited number of defendants, there will be
an incentive to sue only the largest manufacturers. These manufacturers,
although limited in number, would provide near to 100% of the national
market. A consistent focus on the largest manufacturers would result in
a windfall to the manufacturers who controlled a smaller proportion of
the market, because they, in effect, would be imposing risks on the public
without liability for the accompanying losses.
1oo Id. at 512, 539 N.E.2d at 1078, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 950; Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
116 Wis. 2d 166, 192, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49, cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb &
Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
1o See supra note 96 & accompanying text.
"' This is similar to the question raised by California's original statement of
market share liability. That issue was later resolved by Brown v. Superior Court,
44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988). See supra note 85 &
accompanying text.
103 See supra note 99 & accompanying text.
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The second problem associated with the national market share theory
may arise not from the theory itself, but from its application at only a
statewide level. Manufacturers who did not contribute to the actual risk
to the plaintiff in a given New York case may nonetheless be liable in
proportion to their national market share. However, when these manu-
facturers are found liable in a state which operates under a different
theory, they may have to pay damages exceeding their market share.
Thus, in the aggregate, these manufacturers would pay more than a sum
proportional to the risk they imposed. Simultaneously, those who dis-
tributed their products primarily in the New York area would pay less
as they would not be subject to liability in other states.
Finally, because the national market share theory is extremely favor-
able to plaintiffs, there is a substantial possibility that New York will
become a haven for suits in which the plaintiff cannot prove causation
in fact. Most major manufacturers do business in New York, and the
fairly liberal jurisdiction and venue rules would probably allow such
suits.1 0 4 This influx of litigation would place an additional burden on the
already overloaded New York civil justice system. It is quite possible that
the resultant cost increases, lengthy delays and concomitant problems
would substantially outweigh the benefits to the plaintiffs involved in
products liability actions.
Overall, no one theory of liability has found consistent acceptance for
proving causation in fact in products liability actions.
10 5 The theories of
concerted action and alternative liability originated in simple negligence
contexts and have not been widely applied in their pure form.
10 6 Market
104 Since the development of the "minimum contacts" theory set forth in In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), it is apparent that almost
any contact with a state will suffice to meet the due process requirements. Al-
though recent developments have perhaps complicated the application of the
minimum contacts rule, the rule is still operational. Asahi v. Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). As most pharmaceutical
houses have strong marketing efforts in New York, it is apparent that a sub-
stantial number can be subjected to in personam jurisdiction in that state. Hy-
mowitz establishes that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Finally, New York has
a broad long arm statute, see N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. 302 (McKinney 1988), and
venue is appropriate in any county in which a defendant has its "principal office."
Id at 503. "Principal office" has been broadly interpreted to include both the
location designated on the certificate of incorporation and the defendant's prin-
cipal place of business. E.g., Weiss v. Saks Fifth Ave., 157 A.D.2d 475, 476, 549
N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (1990).
105 Even within one jurisdiction, the acceptance of a theory may be ambiguous
or short-lived. E.g., compare Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d
182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (concerted action available in DES suit) with Hy-
mowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941,
cert. denied sub nom. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 110 S.Ct. 350 (1989) (concerted
action rejected; national market share formulated).
106 For references to discussions of the accepted use of these theories, see supra
note 50.
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share theory, although conceptually more appropriate, has proved difficult
to apply, and may now be disfavored in even its progenitor court.10 7 Some
states have used the earlier approaches as springboards to develop tai-
lored theories. 0 8 Finally, a number of states, including Ohio, have not
taken a definite stance or have rejected any expansion of liability.0 9
IV. THE INDETERMINATE DEFENDANT IN OHIO PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Ohio's Approach to Causation In Fact
In many respects, shifts in Ohio products liability law have paralleled
those of the rest of the country. Significantly, Ohio applied the principles
of strict products liability soon after precedent was set by California.11
In 1977, strict liability was expressly recognized as a valid doctrine
through the adoption of section 402(A) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts."' The adoption of strict liability brought with it a recognition of
the underlying policies of allocating risks fairly and reducing the costs
of accidents. These same policies have played an important role in the
courts' approaches to causation in fact problems.1 12
Ohio, by its adherence to more traditional tort principles, has been
slower than some states to adopt a solution to the causation problem
created by the indeterminate defendant. This adherence may reflect a
variety of factors, including the nature of the cases which have arisen in
Ohio, observation of the difficulties encountered by other states, and an
awareness of functions more appropriate to the legislature.
In 1984, several years after California, New York and other states had
developed theories in response to DES litigation, the Ohio Supreme Court
stated its position in Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co. Inc. . 13 In that case the
plaintiff was severely injured when a solvent he was using to clean a
printing press exploded."1 Because Minnich's employer purchased chem-
ically identical solvent, ethyl acetate, from two chemical companies, Min-
107 See supra text accompanying note 85.
101 In addition to Wisconsin's risk share and New Yorks's national market share
theories, Illinois, Michigan and Washington have developed theories which com-
bine various aspects of earlier principles. For a listing of current cases addressing
this topic, see Sherman, supra note 11, Supp. 1989 at § 12.09.
109 At least seven states have explicitly declined to apply market share liability
and various adaptations of alternative liability and concerted action. These states
are Florida, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma and Pennsylvania. See
id.
"o Bauer, supra note 1, at § 6-4 (citing Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio
St.2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966)).
illId. (citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267
(1977)).
12 For a discussion of the policies underlying strict liability, see supra note 2.
113 15 Ohio St. 3d 396, 473 N.E.2d 1199 (1984).
114 Id. at 397, 473 N.E.2d at 1200.
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nich was unable to determine which company had produced the particular
batch involved in the explosion." 5
The court, in allowing the plaintiff to proceed against both suppliers,
adopted the theory of alternative liability as it is expressed in Section
433(B)(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 6 The Minnich court
stressed that before the burden of proof would be shifted to the defendants,
the plaintiff would initially have to prove that two or more defendants
had acted tortiously, and that the plaintiff's injury was proximately
caused by one of the defendants." 7
It is notable that Minnich is a very brief opinion, in which the majority
cites only the Restatement on the issue of alternative liability. Although
market share liability had been created and other theories were being
developed, the problems inherent in altering the plaintiff's burden of proof
regarding causation in fact were not addressed.
The court's lack of discussion may have been a conscious omission,
made for tactical reasons. However, alternative liability was completely
appropriate to the simple tort situation presented in Minnich. First, the
alleged tortious act was committed by only one of two possible parties.
118
In addition to placing no hardship on the plaintiff with respect to joinder,
there was no doubt that one of the two suppliers was the actual tort-
feasor.119 Furthermore, there was no indication that the alleged failure
to warn was an industry-wide practice, or that it had caused a number
of injuries. Because of this, the issues of fair risk allocation within the
chemical industry and promotion of safety procedures were absent.
Minnich, which presented a fact situation very similar to that of Sum-
mers v. Tice,120 was a model case for the application of alternative liability.
However, alternative liability will not always be the most appropriate
solution to the problem faced by the plaintiff who cannot identify one
defendant from a group of tortious actors. 2 1 In particular, situations in-
volving many defendants have been deemed inappropriate for the appli-
cation of alternative liability in many jurisdictions. 22
Since the adoption of alternative liability in Minnich, the Ohio Supreme
Court has reviewed only one products liability case involving an inde-
"I The plaintiff alleged that the suppliers had negligently failed to provide
warnings of the solvent's explosive properties. Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B(3) (1965). See supra notes 19-20
& accompanying text.
11 The Ohio Supreme Court did not address these issues, as the lower court
had granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the basis of the
plaintiff's inability to identify one supplier. Minnich, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 398, 473
N.E.2d at 1200.
11 Id. at 397, 473 N.E.2d at 1200.
19 If each defendant provided equal amounts of the chemical to the plaintiffs
employer, there would be a 50% chance that any one of the suppliers was the
actual tortfeasor. If one of the defendants was only an occasional supplier, and
provided substantially less of the chemical, the application of alternative liability
could have inequitable results. This inequity is mitigated, in part, by the occa-
sional supplier's increased chances of exculpation.
120 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
121 See supra notes 27-33 & accompanying text.
122 Id.
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terminate defendant. In that case, the court recognized the limitations
of alternative liability in a situation where not only many defendants,
but the special problems presented by asbestos were involved. In Goldman
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,123 the plaintiff sued eleven asbestos sup-
pliers, alleging that her husband had developed cancer due to his exposure
to asbestos products at the bakery where he had worked.12 Because the
bakery had burned down, the plaintiff could identify neither the specific
products nor the suppliers. 125
In affirming a summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the court
first determined that the plaintiff could not prove proximate causation
with respect to most of the products, because she had presented insuffi-
cient evidence as to their existence. 12 6 The court did find that one product,
asbestos tape, had been used at the bakery, but declined to apply alter-
native liability to shift the burden of proving causation in fact to the
remaining defendants.127
One of the grounds for the Goldman court's rejection of alternative
liability was that all of the companies that had produced asbestos tape
were not before the court. 128 The court found support for this requirement
in a comment to Section 433(B)(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
because "[t]he cases thus far decided in which [alternative liability] has
been applied have all been cases in which all of the actors involved have
been joined as defendants.' ' 129 Similarly, a second basis for rejecting al-
ternative liability was also found in this comment.130 Here, the court noted
that the theory was traditionally applied in situations where all of the
defendants created similar risks of harm to the plaintiff.'3' Because as-
bestos products that appear to be similar may contain different types and
varying quantities of the substance, asbestos suppliers do not meet this
criterion.1 3 2 Interestingly, like most other courts that have considered this
123 33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987).
14 Id. at 40, 514 N.E.2d at 692.
125 Id.
127Id. at 42, 514 N.E.2d at 693.171Id. at 45, 514 N.E.2d at 696.
'
2 8 Id. at 48, 514 N.E.2d at 699. The court noted that at least 165 companies
have produced or supplied asbestos products. As a result, all of the possible tort-
feasors are seldom before the court in asbestos litigation. The inappropriateness
of alternative liability in Goldman was compounded by the fact that Johns-Man-
ville, the largest asbestos supplier, had reorganized and was no longer amenable
to suit. Id. at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 697.
119 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) comment h (1965)).
130 Id.
13, Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 697.
132 Asbestos is not fungible because at least three variables may result in
functional differences among apparently similar asbestos products. First, asbestos
is the general name for a number of different fibers. Some fibers have more
harmful effects than others. Second, the quantity of asbestos in any given product
is not standardized, but varies with the manufacturer. Finally, asbestos is most
harmful when it is friable, or crushable, because the fibers are then more likely
to become airborne. The friability of a product may depend on the other substances
used in the product, as well as the nature of the product and how it is used. See
generally id. at 50, 514 N.E.2d at 700; Cleveland Board of Education v. Armstrong
World Industries, 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 18, 23, 476 N.E.2d 397, 404 (1985).
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problem, the Goldman court did not apply the remainder of the Restate-
ment comment upon which it had relied. The comment to Section 433(B)(3)
continues:
It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification
of the rule stated may be necessary because of complications
arising from the fact that one of the actors involved is not or
cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect of lapse
of time, or because of substantial differences in the character
of the conduct of the actors or the risks which they have cre-
ated.1
33
The Goldman court noted that alternative liability, in its original form,
imposes joint and several liability, which would be inequitable if either
all of the possible defendants were not present, or if the defendants had
posed varying degrees of risk. 134 A modification of the joinder or fungibility
requirements of alternative liability theory without an accompanying
adjustment of liability allocation would impose a burden unrelated to
causation in fact. This substantial departure from traditional tort prin-
ciples would lead to the problem ofjudicial imposition of absolute, insurer
liability on the members of an industry. 135
Market share liability, which does modify the allocation of liability,
was rejected by the Goldman court, primarily on the grounds that DES,
for which the theory was developed, is fungible, while asbestos is not.
1 36
Recognizing that the application of the market share theory to an asbestos
case would result in the imposition of liability without regard for the risk
imposed by each defendant, the court rejected the theory as a "court-
constructed insurance plan. '137 On a policy basis, the court explained that
"a] device that places liability on manufacturers who were not proved
to have caused the injury involves social engineering more appropriately
within the legislative domain."'
138
The Ohio Supreme Court, in Goldman, recognized the limitations of
the market share theory as a method of liability apportionment in as-
bestos litigation.139 Specifically, market share liability will not fairly al-
locate liability among manufacturers unless their different shares of the
relevant market represent the only variable in the determination of the
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) comment h (1965). For a dis-
cussion of how other courts have approached this issue, see supra note 23.
134 Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 46, 514 N.E.2d at 697.
135 This type of insurer liability would raise issues similar to those discussed
with regard to the imposition of concerted action in DES cases. See supra text
following note 49.
136 Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 514 N.E.2d at 700. For a discussion of the
non-fungibility of asbestos, see supra note 132.
137 Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 52, 514 N.E.2d at 702 (quoting Mulcahy v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986)).
138 Id. at 52, 514 N.E.2d at 701-02.
139 Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 50-52, 514 N.E.2d at 700-02.
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amount of risk each has imposed upon the public.140 Asbestos litigation,
with its unique complications, presents an exceptional number of such
variables, including a product that is not truly generic.' 4 ' However, the
court specifically recognized the need for a solution to the problem posed
by the indeterminate defendant, and noted the possibility of adopting a
theory in a future case.
1 4 2
Other than the two cases considered by the Ohio Supreme Court, there
is very little Ohio law addressing the topic of the indeterminate defendant.
Since Ohio's adoption of alternative liability, the topic has been considered
in only four products actions .'4 Three other cases have discussed alter-
native liability in relation to simple tort claims.'4 In general, the courts
have worked within the parameters set in Minnich. Indeed, none of the
cases have presented fact patterns which required a more liberal or imag-
inative approach.
Similarly, the Ohio legislature has been silent on the issue of proof of
causation in fact by a plaintiff who cannot identify one of many possible
defendants. The Ohio Tort Reform Act, which took effect in 1988, codified
extensive areas of products liability law. 45 Included in the Act are the
'
4
0 Determination of the relevant market proved to be extremely difficult in
litigation involving DES. See supra notes 84, 97 and accompanying text. The
Goldman court noted that determination of an appropriate market in asbestos
litigation would present even greater difficulties. Many injuries attributed to
asbestos are caused by the plaintiffs long term exposure to a variety of products,
possibly in a number of geographical areas. Furthermore, during the relevant
exposure periods, many manufacturers began or ceased making the products.
Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 50, 514 N.E.2d at 700.
141 See supra note 132.
142 Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 51, 52, 514 N.E.2d at 701, 702.
141 Allen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. 026-764 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist.
June 14, 1984) (WESTLAW, OH-CS database) (alternative liability, enterprise
liability, and risk share theories not applicable to asbestos action); Frank v.
Thomson-MacConnell Cadillac, Inc., No. C-870563 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. July
6, 1988) (1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 2657) (alternative liability not applicable where
defendants are not shown to have acted tortiously); Renfro v. Smith Laboratories,
No. S-87-33 (Ohio Ct. App., 6th Dist. Dec. 16, 1988) (1988 Ohio App. LEXIS4941)
(alternative liability not applicable when one of two possible tortfeasors is not
named as defendant and tortious conduct is not demonstrated); Tirey v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 33 Ohio Misc.2d 50,513 N.E.2d 825 (1986) (alternative liability
not applicable where all defendants are not shown to have acted tortiously; market
share, enterprise and concert-of-action theories not applicable).
14, Arrico v. Wessel Enterprises, Inc., No. CA87-06-079 (Ohio Ct. App., 12th
Dist. Dec. 31, 1987) (WESTLAW, OH-CS database) (alternative liability will shift
burden of proof to three negligent defendants); Ruiz v. Greater Cleveland Transit
Authority, No. 50100 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Feb. 6, 1986) (WESTLAW, OH-
CS database) (alternative liability not applicable when defendants have not acted
tortiously); Pang v. Minch, No. 54729 (Ohio Ct. App., 8th Dist. Jan. 12, 1989)
(1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 105) (burden of proof of damage apportionment shifted
to defendants by analogy to rationale for alternative liability).
141 This portion of the Tort Reform Act has been summarized:
Ohio Revised Code sections 2307.71 through 2307.80 and 2315.20 create a
comprehensive program governing product liability litigation. These pro-
visions codify and modify prior law. The consolidation addresses, among
other areas:
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standards for a manufacturer's liability for compensatory damages, with
specifications as to proximate causation and proof of defect in a destroyed
product.146 The absence of a causation in fact provision, in light of the
decision in Goldman and the litigation occurring in other jurisdictions,
may indicate the legislature's intent to leave the area open for judicial
resolution. Regardless of whether the legislature's omission was inten-
tional, for the present it has left the formulation of an approach to the
issue of causation in fact to the Ohio courts. Although the Supreme Court
has rejected market share liability within the narrow ambit of asbestos
litigation in Goldman, it has left open the possibility of adopting a mod-
ified theory for the proof of causation in fact in other situations.
147 As the
legislature has effectively rejected the court's plea for a legislative so-
lution, the likelihood of judicial alternatives is enhanced.
Although Ohio has not experienced the large scale problems with DES
litigation that some other states have faced, it is clear that similar issues
will arise in the future. 148 Mass marketing, the public's need for new
products, competition among suppliers and economically reasonable lim-
itations on quality control will all contribute to other situations where
a. Definition of design and non-design defects;
b. A unified liability standard;
c. Affirmative defenses and comparative fault;
d. Warnings, claims and defenses;
e. Distinctions as to ethical drugs and medical devices;
f. Distinctions between manufacturer and supplier liability standards; and
g. Compensatory and punitive damages.
S. WERBER, TORT REFORM: CHANGES IN THE OHIo LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY xiv
(1988). In addition, the legislature provided for further study in a number of key
areas, including regulation of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, subrogation rights and
the workings of the Ohio Department of Insurance. Id. None of these areas of
investigation specifically addressed the issue of the indeterminate defendant.
146 The plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury
was proximately caused by a product defect. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.73(A)(2)
(Anderson 1988). The defect may be due to manufacture, design, inadequate
warning or nonconformance to the manufacturer's representation. Id. at
§ 2307.73(A)(1). If the product was destroyed, or if the plaintiff cannot establish
the defect by direct evidence for some other reason, circumstantial evidence of
the defect may be used. Id. at § 2307.73(B).
147 For a discussion of Ohio's rejection of market share liability, see supra notes
136-142 & accompanying text. Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio
St. 3d 40, 514 N.E.2d 691 (1987), represented the rejection of a specific theory,
market share liability, in light of the extraordinary difficulties presented by
asbestos litigation. The development of other theories, in non-asbestos cases, is
compatible with the Goldman holding. See, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204, 447 A.2d 539, 542 (1982) (disallowing the state-of-the-
art defense in failure to warn cases); Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J.
429, 454, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984) (limiting the applicability of Beshada to the
facts upon which it arose).
148 DES was not prescribed to pregnant women after 1971, and most women
who were exposed in utero develop noticeable abnormalities by their early twen-
ties. See supra note 65. Thus, the large number of cases brought by DES daughters
are likely to decrease in the 1990's. It is possible, however, that DES will be the
focus of a new wave of litigation by mothers and sons affected by the drug. Id.
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injuries are caused by the substantially similar products of a number of
suppliers. 149 Adherence to only the conceptually limited theory of alter-
native liability in these situations will place an unfair burden on plain-
tiffs, who are least able to pay the costs of their injuries. Furthermore,
because Ohio residents will have no recourse in their own state, an ad-
ditional caseload is likely to be placed on more favorable forums, such as
New York and California.150 To avoid this result, either the legislature,
or the courts, if the appropriate case arises before the legislature has
acted, will need to adopt a theory that strikes a balance between pro-
tecting consumers and placing reasonable burdens on industry.
B. A Suggested Approach for Ohio
A proper approach to proof of causation in fact combines elements of
risk share theory'51 and alternative liability'5 2 with the concept of ap-
portionment of damages found in Ohio's comparative fault statute. 153 This
theory would be available only to those plaintiffs who were unable to
identify one defendant from a number of manufacturers of substantially
similar products. It follows that this theory would supplement rather than
replace alternative liability. 154 If adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court,
this theory would be available only in limited product liability fact pat-
terns.
Under the suggested theory, the plaintiff may initiate an action by
suing only one supplier of the type of product that caused his injury.
However, the plaintiff has the option of suing more than one defendant,
and is actually encouraged to do so to avoid other possible actions being
1
4 9 A number of product types may give rise to suits involving indeterminate
defendants. Workplace chemicals, pesticides, hazardous wastes and second-hand
smoke can all cause injuries in such a way as to make defendant identificationdifficult or impossible. For a discussion of some of these possibilities, see Rhein-
gold, The Future of Product Liability: The Plaintiffs Perspective, PROD. SAFETY
& LIAB. REP (BNA) 711 (July 21, 1989). Generic drugs are also likely to continue
to raise issues of defendant identification and causation, but many of these suits
may be limited to less viable negligence actions. Ohio, like many other states,
recognizes an exception to strict liability for the manufacturers of unavoidably
unsafe products. White v. Wyeth Laboratories, 40 Ohio St.3d 390, 394, 533 N.E.2d
748, 752 (1988) (recognizing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment
k (1965)).
1-o See supra note 104 & accompanying text.151 See supra notes 86-93 & accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 14-26 & accompanying text.
3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1988).
1.4 Alternative liability would still be available in some products liability ac-
tions involving indeterminate defendants. If the plaintiff were able to bring all
possible tortfeasors before the court, if the defendant group was very small and
if the plaintiff proved the other necessary elements, alternative liability could be
the most efficient and equitable theory available. No attempt is made here to
define all of the situations when alternative liability would still be applicable,
as its criteria are not altered by the proposed theory.
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barred by the statute of limitations.
55 After the plaintiff has initiated
the action, the defendants may implead other manufacturers of the prod-
uct as third party defendants.
Allowing the plaintiff to proceed in this manner has several advantages.
First, the plaintiff is relieved of the necessity of joining all possible man-
ufacturers, as currently required under Ohio's pure alternative liability
theory. This avoids denying compensation to injured parties in those
instances where more than a few manufacturers have acted tortiously.
Second, the court is relieved of the costs and potential inaccuracies of
determining the appropriate defendant group.
156 A third advantage is
obtained by the plaintiff's incentives to make every effort to join as many
suppliers as he reasonably can. Finally, the defendants are prompted to
use their superior knowledge of the industry to implead other manufac-
turers. Utilizing this industry knowledge decreases the likelihood of the
actual tortfeasor escaping liability, and thus helps to maintain a sub-
stantial link to causation in fact.
The plaintiff, or the third party plaintiffs, must establish a prima facie
case against each defendant by establishing two factors by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
made the type of product in question, and that the product was 
defective. 157
The plaintiff then must show that his injury was proximately caused by
the product defect. 158 Consistent with the alternative liability theory, each
defendant may exculpate itself by showing either that it did not produce
the product at all, that it did not produce the product at the time relevant
to the plaintiff, or that it did not supply the product in the geographical
area relevant to the plaintiff. 5
9
Allowing defendants to escape liability in this manner avoids the in-
surance approach taken by the New York courts, and maintains a focus
on causation in fact. The fairness of allocating risk for only those activ-
ities which actually benefited the manufacturer is coupled with a practical
consideration. The opportunity for exculpation tends to make manufac-
turers liable only for the risks imposed upon a known market. Because
155 This is the same method used in wisconsin's risk share theory, which was
set out in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied
sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 (1984). See supra note 88
& accompanying text.
56 The long run efficiency of requiring the plaintiff to sue only one defendant
may, initially, appear to be negated by the extra time required for the defendants
to implead other manufacturers. However, this delay may be offset by the fact
that plaintiffs will be able to bring their suits much sooner.
1"I This requirement is consistent with Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.73(A)(1)
(Anderson 1988). See supra note 146.
,51 This proximate causation requirement is consistent with OHIo REV. CODE
ANN- § 2307.73(A)(2) (Anderson 1988). See supra note 146.
159 Allowing a manufacturer to exculpate itself on the basis of geographical
area could permit a potentially culpable party to avoid liability if a product was
transported across a state line. For this reason, the relevant geographical area
may be established by the plaintiff, and is not necessarily the place where the
suit is brought.
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a known risk can be anticipated, industry is then able to provide for its
liability through insurance and by passing the costs on to consumers
through product prices.
Finally, damages are apportioned by importing the distinction between
economic and noneconomic loss expressed in Ohio's comparative fault
statute.160 In this application, the trier of fact separates the plaintiffs
total damages into categories of economic loss, including lost wages, med-
ical expenses and other special damages, and noneconomic loss, including
pain and suffering and other intangible damages.161 All of the remaining
defendants are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's economic
harm, but are only severally liable for the noneconomic harm. 162 The trier
of fact apportions liability for noneconomic harm among the defendants
by considering a number of factors including relative market share, par-
ticipation in industry-wide standards, role in determining such standards,
and individual marketing techniques. 63
160 The language of Ohio's comparative fault statute refers to actions in neg-
ligence, rather than to strict liability. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson
1988). However, this does not preclude the adoption of elements of the statute for
use in a products liability action. It is notable that other states, in strict liability
actions, have applied contributory negligence statutes to apportion liability
among defendants. See supra note 92 & accompanying text. Similarly, only the
method of apportioning fault among defendants set out in § 2315.19 of the Ohio
Revised Code is applied here. See infra notes 160, 161 & accompanying text.
The suggested use of Ohio's comparative fault statute is also compatible with
existing Ohio caselaw. In Bowling v. Heil, 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373(1987), § 2315.19 was held to be inapplicable to strict liability actions when it
was applied for the purpose of comparing the fault of the plaintiff to the fault of
the defendant. The proposed application of the statute does not involve that
comparison.
Finally, even if Bowling is interpreted to prohibit all use of the comparative
negligence statute in strict liability cases, it would not pose a bar to future judicial
action. Ohio courts have recognized that, in some instances, the best decisions
require a departure from recent precedent:
So often ... we find.., nonsense about a revolving door treatment of stare
decisis. The implication in such view is that any recent legal precedent of
this court containing bad law should not be overruled. This is not the correct
meaning of stare decisis. Bad law created by a court, even though only a
day old, should be overruled ....
Wilfong v. Batdorf, 6 Ohio St. 3d 100, 105, 451 N.E.2d 1185, 1189-90 (1983)(Celebrezze, J. concurring) (overruling recent precedent to allow the retrospective
application of Ohio's comparative negligence statute). In products cases involvingindeterminate defendants, the combination of strict liability and relaxed causa-
tion criteria create a new type of insurer liability among manufacturers. Cor-
respondingly, a new method of apportioning fault through the application of
comparative principles is necessary to prevent the imposition of absolute liability.
161 This division of damages by the trier of fact is consistent with OHfo REV.CODE ANN. §§ 2315.19(B)(2), (B)(3) (Anderson 1988). Revised Code§§ 2315.19(E)(1)(a), (E)(1)(c) define economic loss. A partial list of damages that
qualify as noneconomic loss is set out in Revised Code § 2315.19(E)(3).
16 This division of where liability will be joint and several or only several isfound in OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.19(D)(l)(b)-(D)(1)(c) (Anderson 1988).
'6 This list is not exclusive. The particular factors considered by the trier of
fact will depend, in part, on the nature of the product involved. For example, this
apportionment process could take into account some of the smaller differences in
risk that occur when products of the manufacturers are not truly generic.
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This method of damage apportionment is critical to the balance
achieved by the proposed method of altering the burden of causation in
fact. By providing the injured plaintiff with assured complete recovery
of actual monetary loss, the problems of inadequate compensation that
may be encountered in market share or national market share liability
are avoided. 1r At the same time, limiting joint and several liability to
this liquidated amount minimizes the departure from causation in fact
and goals of fair risk apportionment. Finally, imposing only several li-
ability for noneconomic loss will not substantially detract from the goals
of strict liability. Maintenance of joint and several liability for economic
loss should adequately serve as a safety incentive, and thus reduce the
costs associated with injuries.
V. CONCLUSION
Fungible products have created substantial difficulties for injured con-
sumers who cannot identify their source. At this time, the problem has
been highlighted primarily by litigation involving diethylstilbestrol,
other drugs and workplace hazards. The realities of mass production in
competitive industries, and society's need for reasonably priced products
ensure that the issue will continue to arise in the future.
The problem posed by the indeterminate defendant has required courts
to juxtapose two distinct concepts. Traditional tort principles, perceptions
of fairness and the necessity of reasonable limits on industry's obligations
require that liability be strongly linked to causation. The policies of re-
ducing injury costs and protection of the consumer, which fostered the
development of strict liability, must also be considered.
Several modified causation theories have been developed and tested in
other jurisdictions. The experiences of those jurisdictions provide a back-
ground against which a balanced and effective approach can be applied
when the causation in fact issue next arises. The theory proposed for Ohio
seeks to strike a balance between the two fundamental policy consider-
ations, and to provide a flexible framework for achieving equitable results.
REBECCA J. GREENBERG
I" See supra notes 85,,99 & accompanying text.
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